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Instantiating Metalevel Argumentation
Frameworks
Anthony P. YOUNG a,1, Nadin KOKCIYAN a, Isabel SASSOON a, Sanjay MODGIL a,
and Simon PARSONS a
aDepartment of Informatics, King’s College London
Abstract. We directly instantiate metalevel argumentation frameworks (MAFs) to
enable argumentation-based reasoning about information relevant to various ap-
plications. The advantage of this is that information that typically cannot be in-
corporated via the instantiation of object-level argumentation frameworks can now
be incorporated, in particular information referencing (1) preferences over argu-
ments, (2) the rationale for attacks, and (3) the dialectical effect of critical questions
that shifts the burden of proof when posed. We achieve this by using a variant of
ASPIC+ and a higher-order typed language that can reference object-level formu-
lae and arguments. We illustrate these representational advantages with a running
example from clinical decision support.
Keywords. Formal models for argumentation, type theory
1. Introduction
Argumentation theory is concerned with the theory and implementation of artiﬁcial in-
telligence systems that perform argumentation-based reasoning, which can resolve con-
ﬂicting information and present the reasons for or against a claim, such as recommending
a decision [1,4,25]. In argumentation theory, such claims are conclusions of arguments,
which are explained by being inferred from premises and rules of that argument [21],
as well as showing how other arguments that disagree with such claims are not justi-
ﬁed (e.g. [16]). Abstract argumentation frameworks (AFs) formalise the idea of what it
means for an argument to be justiﬁed based on how arguments disagree with each other
[11]. However, AFs by themselves do not represent and enable argumentation-based rea-
soning about all the information relevant to a given reasoning task, such as preferences.
Preference-based argumentation frameworks (PAFs) incorporate preferences between
arguments that are assumed to be given exogenously, say by the values of an audience in
the case of value-based argumentation frameworks (VAFs), and are not themselves the
objects of reasoning and disagreement [2,8,20,24]. On the other hand, extended argu-
mentation frameworks (EAFs) [15,19] (with earlier work by [3,9]) have shown how one
can incorporate argumentation-based reasoning about possibly conﬂicting preferences.
However, EAFs are limited with respect to being able to comprehensively incor-
porate reasoning about preferences. Even when instantiated with logical structure [19],
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EAFs can only refer to when one rule within an argument is more preferred than another
rule. But there may be situations where we would like to refer to when an argument as a
whole is more preferred to another argument. For example, in clinical decision support,
an argument for one course of treatment T1 may be more preferred than another argument
for another course of treatment T2, because T1 is elicited from clinical practice guidelines
that are more relevant to the patient being treated, as compared to T2.
In addition to reasoning about preferences, one might want to represent reasons for
attacks between arguments. In logic-based argumentation, the rationale for an attack is
the presence of contradictory information. However there may be other kinds of reasons
for attacks. For example, in medical reasoning where only one of two drugs can be ad-
ministered, e.g. due to costs or undesirable side effects, and there is no intrinsic logi-
cal contradiction precluding joint administration. Metalevel argumentation frameworks
(MAFs) [17] can potentially represent such reasons for attacks, given that they include
meta-arguments with claims of the form attk(a,b), which state that the object-level ar-
gument a attacks object-level argument b. However, meta-arguments as presented in [17]
have no internal structure, and serve only in providing a uniform representation of AFs,
PAFs, VAFs and EAFs. In this paper, we investigate how working directly with MAFs
by instantiating them with structure, can enable a richer representation of the range of
possible reasons for preferences and attacks.
Arguments can be constructed through the instantiation of argument schemes (ASes)
[27], which provide general patterns of arguments, and can be questioned with a given
scheme’s associated critical questions (CQs). Given an argument a instantiating an AS,
CQs have two functions: (1) they point to possible counter-arguments to a, and (2) they
question the presumptions of a, and so shift the burden of proof such that further argu-
ments must be put forward to argue for the presumptions questioned. Until this burden of
proof is met, a cannot be said to be justiﬁed. As interrogative information is not declara-
tive, it is currently not obvious how to represent questions and their effects in logic-based
instantiations of object-level argumentation frameworks. We therefore investigate how
structured MAFs can allow us to represent this second interrogative effect of CQs.2
In this paper, we show how working directly in the metalevel (i.e. without referring
to a prior object-level framework), and by instantiating MAFs with structure, can (1) en-
able the representation of a wider range of reasons behind preferences and attacks, and
(2) model the effect of how asking CQs can shift the burden of proof. We endow meta-
arguments with structure using defeasible ASPIC+ – ASPIC+D [14,20] – where ASPIC
+
D
arguments are now meta-arguments. This work is similar to [22], although the main dif-
ference is that we work directly in the metalevel without using support relations to anchor
a prior object-level AF to the MAF. In order to refer to object-level information, we use a
higher-order typed language [7] that is sufﬁciently expressive to refer to object-level for-
mulae, arguments, attacks, preferences and the posing of questions. Starting in Section
2.3, we illustrate these ideas with a running example from clinical decision support.
In Section 2, we recap abstract, metalevel and structured argumentation theory, as
well as questions in the context of argument schemes and critical questions. In Section
3, we make use of a higher-order typed language and provide a structured account of
metalevel argumentation using this language. In Section 4 we conclude and comment on
related and future work.
2CQs are thus an AS-speciﬁc case of a why locution [23]. This effect of shifting the burden of proof is more
generally exempliﬁed by why locutions in dialogical argumentation [16].
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2. Background
2.1. Metalevel Argumentation
Recall from [11] that an abstract argumentation framework (AF) is a directed graph
〈A,R〉 where A and R ⊆ A2 are, respectively, the arguments and attacks ((a,b) ∈ R, de-
noted R(a,b), means that a attacks b). In what follows let S ⊆ A. We say S is conﬂict-
free (cf) iff S2 ∩R = ∅. Let d(S) := {a ∈ A (∀b ∈ A) [R(b,a)⇒ (∃c ∈ S)R(c,b)]}. We
say S is self-defending (sd) iff S ⊆ d(S). Then: S is an admissible set iff S is both
cf and sd; S is a complete extension iff S is an admissible set satisfying d(S) ⊆ S; S
is a preferred extension iff S is a ⊆-maximal complete extension; S is a stable ex-
tension iff S is cf and attacks all arguments outside of it. Then S is the grounded
extension iff S is the ⊆-least complete extension. The set of Dung semantics is
S := {complete, preferred, stable, grounded}. For s ∈S and a ∈ A, we say a is scepti-
cally (credulously) justiﬁed w.r.t. s iff a is in all (some) s-extensions.
Metalevel argumentation [17] formalises the idea of how one can argue about the
justiﬁcation status of the arguments in AFs, PAFs, VAFs and EAFs (see Section 1). In
the case of AFs, given 〈A,R〉, its corresponding metalevel argumentation framework
(MAF) is the abstract argumentation framework 〈Am,Rm〉, where
Am :={ jus(a),re j(a) a ∈ A}∪{attk(a,b) a,b ∈ A, R(a,b)}
Rm :={( jus(a),re j(a)) ,(re j(a),attk(a,b)) ,(attk(a,b), jus(b)) a,b ∈ A, R(a,b)} .
Am is the set of meta-arguments and Rm the set of meta-attacks for 〈A,R〉. Here, 〈A,R〉
is the object-level AF. Intuitively, given a,b ∈ A, jus(a) (similarly, re j(a)) is the meta-
argument claiming that the object-level argument a is justiﬁed (rejected). The meta-
argument attk(a,b) is an argument accounting for the existence of the attack R(a,b). The
reasons for the meta-attacks are as follows. Let a,b ∈ A. The argument a is justiﬁed iff
all attacks against it fail. Therefore, any attack, say from b, is a threat against the claim
that a is justiﬁed, hence attk(b,a) meta-attacks jus(a). If b is attacking a, then b must
be justiﬁed in order for the attack to be valid. Therefore, re j(b) meta-attacks attk(b,a).
See [17, Section 3.1] for why jus(a) meta-attacks re j(a). Under this setup, [17, Theo-
rem 2] states that for s ∈S , jus(a) ∈ Am is sceptically (credulously) justiﬁed w.r.t. s (in
〈Am,Rm〉) iff a ∈ A is sceptically (credulously) justiﬁed w.r.t. s (in 〈A,R〉).
MAFs are useful because they provide a uniform representation of AFs and their
important generalisations (speciﬁcally PAFs, VAFs and EAFs) such that the method for
calculating justiﬁed arguments follows the simpler and more intuitive method of AFs.
This also opens up the way for generalisations of labelling semantics [10] and argument
game proof theories [18] to these more general frameworks.
In the case of EAFs [15][17, Section 3.6], where if R(a,b), then the argument c ex-
pressing the preference a< b can attack the attack R(a,b), and is represented by the meta-
argument aattk(c,a,b), which meta-attacks attk(a,b), and is meta-attacked by re j(c)
because c must be justiﬁed in order for this attack on an attack to be valid.
Example 2.1. Consider the EAF with arguments a,b,c, attack R(a,b), and the argu-
ment c attacks the attack R(a,b). The meta-arguments are jus(a), re j(a), jus(b), re j(b),
jus(c), re j(c), attk(a,b) and aattk(c,a,b). These arguments and their meta-attacks are
illustrated in the MAF in Figure 2.1.
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a b
c
jus(a) jus(b)
jus(c) re j(c)
re j(b)re j(a) attk(a,b)
aattk(c,a,b)
Figure 2.1. The EAF (Left) and Corresponding MAF (Right), from Example 2.1
The MAF representation of EAFs also has a correspondence result [17, Theorem 7].
2.2. Structured Argumentation with ASPIC+D
We recap the defeasible fragment of ASPIC+ [5,20] – ASPIC+D [14] – which is less
complex than the full ASPIC+ and is readily implemented, while still retaining sufﬁcient
expressive power for our purposes. Let L be a set of well-formed formulae (wffs). Let
− :L →P (L ) be the contrary function, such that θ ⊆L denotes the set of wffs that
disagree with θ . Let k ∈ N and (∀1≤ i≤ k)θi, φ ∈L . A defeasible rule is denoted as
(θ1, . . . ,θk ⇒ φ).3 LetRd be the set of defeasible rules. The naming function is a partial
function n : Rd → L . The structure AS := 〈L ,−,Rd ,n〉 is called an argumentation
system.
Let Kp ⊆L be a distinguished subset of wffs called the set of ordinary premises.
We call the pair AT :=
〈
AS,Kp
〉
an argumentation theory. Given AT , we can construct
arguments from Kp and Rd as follows.
1. (Base) If θ ∈Kp, then [θ ] is a singleton argument with premises Prem([θ ]) :=
{θ}, conclusion Conc([θ ]) := θ , defeasible rules DR([θ ]) := ∅, subargu-
ments Sub([θ ]) := {[θ ]} and top rule TopRule([θ ]) = ∗ (i.e. undeﬁned).
2. (Inductive) Let k ∈ N and for 1 ≤ i ≤ k let Ai be an argument with premises
Prem(Ai)⊆Kp, conclusionConc(Ai) =: θi ∈L and defeasible rules DR(Ai)⊆
Rd . Let r := (θ1, . . . ,θk ⇒ φ) ∈Rd . Then B := [A1, . . . ,Ak ⇒ φ ] is an argument
with Prem(B) :=
⋃k
i=1Prem(Ak) ⊆ Kp, Conc(B) = φ ∈ L , DR(B) := {r} ∪⋃k
i=1DR(Ai)⊆Rd , Sub(B) := {Ai}ki=1∪{B} ⊆A and TopRule(B) = r ∈Rd .
Now let A be the set of all such arguments. Given − and n, arguments A,B ∈ A can
attack each other. In the following three deﬁnitions, let a :=Conc(A).
1. A undermines B iff there is some b ∈ Prem(B) such that a ∈ b.
2. A rebuts B at B′ ∈ Sub(B) iff b′ :=Conc(B′) such that a ∈ b′.
3. A undercuts B at B′ ∈ Sub(B) iff r := TopRule(B′) is well-deﬁned such that
a ∈ n(r).
Just like ASPIC+, ASPIC+D deﬁnes preferences ≺ between arguments in terms of pref-
erences < between those arguments’ defeasible rules and ordinary premises [20, Section
5]. Let ↪→⊆ A 2 be the relation such that (A,B) ∈↪→ iff A undercuts B, or [A ≺ B and
(A rebuts or undermines B)], all at some appropriate B′ ∈ Sub(B). 〈A , ↪→〉 forms a di-
rected graph, on which we can calculate the justiﬁed arguments and claims as in abstract
argumentation.
3We allow for the possibility of k = 0, in which case we have the defeasible rule (⇒ φ).
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2.3. Argument Schemes, Critical Questions, and a Running Example from Medicine
Argument schemes (ASes) are semi-formal representations of common patterns of ev-
eryday reasoning [27]. An argument scheme (AS) is thus a template that allows one to
construct arguments expressed in natural or formal languages as in ASPIC+, but with
enough precision to make its assumptions and claim clear. For example:
Example 2.2. Abstractly, argument from expert opinion is the following AS:4 If
(premise 1) E is an expert and (premise 2) E claims θ , then (claim) θ is true.
Concretely, consider instantiating this in the medical domain. Eric is an overweight
52-year-old male who is suffering from high blood pressure and chronic lower back pain.
In his latest visit to his doctor (general practitioner, GP), who is an expert at diagnos-
ing strokes, she writes in his medical report5 that Eric had experienced a mini-stroke
(transient ischemic attack, TIA). It is fair to conclude that Eric had a mini-stroke.
ASes specialised to concrete domains can be speciﬁed [26]. The following example is an
AS specialised for the medical domain.
Example 2.3. Given (premise 1) the patient facts F, (premise 2) that the treatment goal
G should be realised, and (premise 3) treatment T promotes goal G, then (claim) treat-
ment T should be recommended. This argument scheme for proposed treatment [13] is
a medical specialisation of Walton’s sufﬁcient condition scheme for actions [27].
Each AS is has a set of critical questions (CQs), which are a means to perform due
diligence when reasoning non-deductively with ASes. By questioning the truth of the
assumptions of an AS, or the validity of the instantiated AS itself, CQs can either point
towards counterarguments, or shift the burden of proof by requesting further reasons. If
this burden of proof cannot be met, the argument based on that AS is not considered
justiﬁed.
Example 2.4. (Example 2.2 continued) Abstractly, the associated CQs that question the
premises are: “Is E an expert?”; “Did E really claim θ?”; “Is θ really true?”.
As an example of the second CQ, suppose Eric questions whether his GP really
wrote “TIA” on his medical report, because the handwriting really seems to read “TIN”
(tubulo-interstitial nephritis, a type of kidney inﬂammation, which would be consistent
with Eric’s chronic lower back pain). Then Eric could be suspicious of whether he really
did have a mini-stroke, especially as he does not remember feeling anything different
on the day of the TIA. If Eric asks his GP for clariﬁcation, his question would put the
burden of proof onto the GP, such that if she fails to answer the question satisfactorily,
Eric could be justiﬁed in not believing that he suffered a mini-stroke.
We will now see how the effect of a CQ requesting for further reasons and so shifting
the burden of proof, rather than asserting contrary information, can be represented as an
attack in our structured treatment of MAFs.
4We present a simpliﬁed version of the full scheme that is sufﬁcient for our purposes.
5Many countries, such as the United Kingdom, still use handwritten medical reports.
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3. Instantiating Metalevel Argumentation Frameworks
The discussion and examples in the previous two sections motivate the following ques-
tions: how can we expand the range of reasons that can be represented in structured ar-
gumentation in relation to preferences (e.g. where we may need to refer to the argument
as a whole), and attacks (e.g. in cases that are not restricted to logical contradiction,
such as how performing one action excludes another)? Further, how can we represent the
dialectical effect of asking CQs that shift the burden of proof? As recapped in Section
2.1, the metalevel representation of AFs and EAFs give rise to meta-arguments such as
attk(a,b) and aattk(c,a,b), suggesting that working in the metalevel can give a rationale
for attacks and preferences respectively. However, to fully account for such object level
information would require for meta-arguments to have structure, i.e. that their conclu-
sions are explained in terms of how they follow from premises via well-deﬁned rules of
inference. One way to endow MAFs with structure is to use ASPIC+D .
But why should these underlying arguments be meta-arguments in some MAF as
opposed to just being arguments in some AF? This is because such reasoning tasks typ-
ically involve information such as preferences and the reasons for attacks, which are
treated exogenously, i.e. as a “given”, in standard AFs, in which case the relation R⊆ A2
is ﬁxed. In our approach we enable reasoning about such information. Applebaum et al.
have argued that working directly with MAFs can explain why arguments disagree and
how preferences can nullify attacks [5], while still retaining the more straightforward
approach to calculating which arguments are justiﬁed [11]. Following this reasoning, we
will therefore work directly in the metalevel instead of ﬁrst constructing an object-level
AF and then translating into the metalevel.
We could just work in the object level and then translate to the metalevel as in [22],
but the framework of [22] deﬁnes arguments and attacks in terms of what is represented
in the object-level. That object-level is based on ASPIC+ and suffers from the same
limitations as [19] in that (e.g.) the underlying logical language cannot refer to arguments
as a whole, e.g. when dealing with preferences.
Working directly in the metalevel requires that we refer to object-level arguments
and their conclusions / rules (of inference) / premises with the same language. This lan-
guage should at least be higher order, as conclusions are formulae and premises are sets
of formulae, while arguments are not directly expressible in the language.6 Furthermore,
this language should recognise that formulae, rules and arguments are of different na-
tures. One way of accommodating these aspects is to use a local language. This is a
higher-order typed language that allows for the reconstruction of set theory, called a local
set theory [7, Chapter 3], and whose models are given by elementary topoi [12]. Local
languages satisfy the theorems of higher-order intuitionistic logic. The basic ideas of a
local language will allow us to represent arguments, their premises, their conclusions and
their rules in a uniform manner. We will see that using local languages as the underlying
ASPIC+D language is a sufﬁciently ﬂexible representational framework to offer a declar-
ative representation of CQs by capturing the shift in burden of proof as a meta-attack;
this is our answer to the question raised at the end of Section 2.3. We will continue our
running example in the medical domain by building on Examples 2.3 and 2.4.
6As a simple example in ASPIC+D , if a,b ∈L and a ∈Kp, then the rule (a⇒ b) ∈Rd is not a member of
L , and the argument [[a]⇒ b] ∈A is also not a member of L .
A.P. Young et al. / Instantiating Metalevel Argumentation Frameworks102
3.1. Representing Reasons Behind Attacks and Preferences
We begin with ASPIC+D [14], where the ASPIC
+
D arguments now represent meta-
arguments. We denote the argumentation system with subscript “m” meaning “meta”, i.e.
ASm =
〈
Lm,−m,Rd,m,nm
〉
and ATm =
〈
ASm,Kp,m
〉
, where the symbols mean the same
concepts as in Section 2.2. We now deﬁne Lm as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.1. Our ASPIC+ meta-language, Lm, has the following data:7 The types
are: the truth value type Ω and three ground types: wff for well-formed formulae, arg
for argument, and rule for (defeasible) rules. Let τ be a type, then its power type is
denotedPτ , which is also a well-deﬁned type that “collects together” entities of another
type; all types have power types. Further, let τ and τ ′ be types, then its product type is
denoted τ × τ ′, which is also a well-deﬁned type; all pairs of types can be combined in
this way.
We also have the following function symbols and their signatures which denote
the types of their inputs and outputs: contrary − : wff → Pwff, name n : rule → wff,
premises Prem : arg →Pwff, conclusion Conc : arg → wff, subargument Sub : arg →
Parg, rule DR : arg→Prule and preference Pre f : arg×arg→ wff.
For each type we have countably many variables available. For a type τ , we say a
variable x or a term t (see below) has type τ by writing x : τ or t : τ , respectively, e.g.
A : arg means the variable A is of type “arg”, θ : wff means the variable θ is of type
“wff”... etc.8
The terms for this languageL are as follows: a variable x of type τ , x : τ , is a term,
and if t : τ is a term and f : τ → τ ′ is a function symbol, then f (t) : τ ′ is also a term. If
α : Ω and x : τ are terms then the term {x α} : Pτ is well-deﬁned.9 (Equality) If t : τ
and t ′ : τ are terms then t  t ′ : Ω is also a term. (Membership) If t : τ and s : Pτ are
terms, then tεs :Ω is also a term.10 We call a term of type Ω a formula.
See [7, page 70] on how we can combine formulae with the usual constructions such as
logical connectives and bounded quantiﬁers. For knowledge representation purposes, we
deﬁne the following distinguished predicates over variables of type arg.
Deﬁnition 3.2. In Lm, we have the following distinguished predicates over variables
of type arg: jus(·) and re j(·) are unary predicates, attk (·, ·) is a binary predicate, and
aattk(·, ·, ·) is a ternary predicate. All of these predicates are of type Ω (omitted).
Our meta-knowledge base contains information we wish to reason about, such that
if we can speak of an argument, then we can speak of its components.
Deﬁnition 3.3. Our meta-knowledge base, denotedKp,m, is a subclass ofLm satisfying
the following argument closure condition: if A : arg∈Kp,m then Prem(A) :Pwff∈Kp,m,
Conc(A) : wff ∈Kp,m, Sub(A) :Parg ∈Kp,m and DR(A) :Prule ∈Kp,m.
7 For simplicity, only a portion of the full deﬁnition of local language in [7, pp. 69 - 71] is given. This in-
complete deﬁnition is sufﬁcient for the rest of the paper, as we are interested in articulating the representational
rather than the reasoning aspects of Lm.
8We have Pre f (A,B) : wff denote that A : arg is strictly more preferred than B : arg.
9This is a power term, the intuition of which is to form a new term that collects together terms of another
given type. Just like in ﬁrst-order logic, variables can be free or bound in {x α}. We call a term with no free
variables closed. We can perform substitutions on free variables in the same manner as in ﬁrst-order logic.
10Note for the syntax of the local language we use ε and  to be interpreted as ∈ and =, respectively.
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Example 3.4. (Example 2.4 continued) Eric’s GP would like to prevent future strokes
by lowering Eric’s blood pressure with medication. We populate Kp,m as follows. The
GP may prescribe Eric one of either a low or high dose of a given drug. The arguments
for these treatment options are formalised as drugl : arg and drugh : arg respectively.
As prescribing one excludes the other, we also have Conc(drugl)εConc(drugh)m :Ω and
Conc(drugh)εConc(drugl)m :Ω. The GP prefers to prescribe the lower dose, represented
as an argument gp : arg such that (∃SεSub(gp))Conc(S)  Pre f (drugl ,drugh) : Ω.11
This is because the guidelines recommending the lower dose mention patient criteria that
better match Eric’s proﬁle, compared to the guidelines of the higher dose.
However, Eric argues that lifestyle changes can lower his blood pressure, repre-
sented by ls : arg. Furthermore, Eric argues that this would exclude the need for any med-
ication, represented by Conc(ls)εConc(drugl)m : Ω and Conc(ls)εConc(drugh)m : Ω.
The GP disagrees with Eric’s claim that lifestyle changes excludes either drug option,
which we represent as ¬Conc(ls)εConc(drugl)m :Ω, where “¬” denotes (intuitionistic)
negation of formulae in Lm.12 The resulting Kp,m also has all of the above terms and
formulae, as well as (e.g.) Conc(drugh) : wff, Prem(ls) :Pwff... etc. by Deﬁnition 3.3.
In order to construct meta-arguments, we need suitable defeasible rules. Intuitively, these
rules capture, on the basis of object-level information in Kp,m, when arguments are jus-
tiﬁed, rejected, or when they attack each other.
Deﬁnition 3.5. Rd,m contains the following logical meta-argumentation rules.
– The rules of justiﬁcation status are (A : arg⇒ jus(A)) and (A : arg⇒ re j(A)).
– Let A : arg, B : arg ∈ Kp,m. We use rb(A,B) to denote Conc(A) ε Conc(B)m :
Ω, um(A,B) to denote (∃θ ε Prem(B))Conc(A) ε θm : Ω, and uc(A,B) to denote
(∃r ε DR(B))Conc(A) ε nm(r)m :Ω.
– We then have the following three defeasible rules concerning meta-attacks: (A :
arg, B : arg, X(A,B) ⇒ attk(A,B)) where X ∈ {rb,um,uc}. Further, we include three
rules that are the “converses” of the meta-attack rules, which accommodate disagree-
ment about the reasons behind the attack. They are, for X ∈ {rb,um,uc}: (A : arg, B :
arg, ¬X(A,B) ⇒ ¬attk(A,B)). The rule of preferences are, for X ∈ {rb,um,uc}, (A :
arg, B : arg,C : arg, (∃SεSub(C))Conc(S)Pre f (B,A) :Ω, X(A,B)⇒ aattk(C,A,B)).13
The rules that are the “converses” of the meta-attack rules allows us to construct meta-
arguments stating there is no disagreement. Generally, meta-arguments are constructed
in the same manner as ASPIC+, where such arguments now account for information as
to the reasons behind attacks.
Example 3.6. (Example 3.4 continued) We can construct the following meta-arguments.
The justiﬁcation status rules give Jus(x) := [[x : arg] ⇒ jus(x)] and Re j(x) := [[x :
arg] ⇒ re j(x)] for x ∈ {drugh,drugl , ls,gp}, i.e. each of the four arguments has
a meta-argument claiming that it is justiﬁed, and another meta-argument claiming
that it is rejected. The attack rules give meta-arguments such as Attk(ls,drugh) :=
[[ls : arg], [drugh : arg], [Conc(ls) ε Conc(drugh)m : Ω] ⇒ attk(ls,drugh)], i.e. the con-
11This is correct syntax as existential quantiﬁers are well-deﬁned in the local language, see [7, page 70].
12For simplicity, we focus only on the case of excluding drugl ; the representation is analogous for drugh.
13This captures the idea that in order to refute the attack from A to B, C either assumes or concludes that B
is strictly more preferred to A, in a way that refers to the arguments A and B as a whole within the argumentC.
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clusion of ls : arg excludes the conclusion of drugh : arg (similarly with drugl :
arg), and ¬Attk(ls,drugl) := [[ls : arg], [drugl : arg], [¬Conc(ls)εConc(drugl)m :Ω]⇒
¬attk(ls,drugl)]. The rule of preference give the argument [[gp : arg], [drugl : arg],
[drugh : arg], [(∃SεSub(C))Conc(S)  Pre f (drugl ,drugh) : Ω], [rb(drugl ,drugh)] ⇒
aattk(gp,drugh,drugl)] =: Aattk(gp,drugh,drugl).
The meta-attacks are deﬁned by the meta-contrary function −m as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.7. −m is a function on Lm that is deﬁned only on: re j(A)m = { jus(A)},
attk(A,B)m = {re j(A),aattk(C,A,B)}, jus(B)m = {attk(A,B)}, aattk(C,A,B)m = {re j(C)},
and for any θ :Ω ∈Lm, we have θm = {¬θ}, and ¬θm = {θ}.
Example 3.8. (Example 3.6 continued) Figure 3.1 illustrates the largest connected com-
ponent of the directed graph of meta-arguments and meta-attacks.14
Re j(drugh) Attk(drugh,drugl) Aattk(gp,drugh,drugl)
Jus(drugh) Jus(drugl) Re j(gp)
Attk(drugl ,drugh) Re j(drugl) Jus(gp)
Attk(ls,drugh) Attk(ls,drugl)
Re j(ls) Jus(ls) ¬Attk(ls,drugl)
Figure 3.1. The meta-argumentation framework from Example 3.8.
Justiﬁcation is calculated as in abstract argumentation [11]. It can be shown that this
instantiation of ASPIC+ is normatively rational [20, Section 4.2].
Example 3.9. (Example 3.8 continued) Figure 3.1 has two stable extensions, one rep-
resenting the GP’s perspective by having ¬Attk(ls,drugl) and hence Jus(ls), Jus(gp)
and Jus(drugl) justiﬁed, and the other representing Eric’s perspective by having
Attk (ls,drugl), Jus(ls) and Jus(gp) justiﬁed.15
This example develops the example in [13], using MAFs instead of EAFs to enable a
richer representation of the reasons for attacks and preferences, and accounts for multiple
perspectives as extensions. Notice that one can use (meta-)preferences (which are the
usual preferences of ASPIC+) to arbitrate between Attk(ls,drugl) and ¬Attk(ls,drugl),
and hence decide between the extensions (i.e., perspectives). However, these preferences
can themselves be reasoned with in an appropriate meta-meta-argumentation framework.
In future work, we will investigate whether this complication is necessary.
14There are also “stray” singleton meta-arguments such as [Prem(ls) :Pwff ] or [DR(drugl) :Prule], which
are always accepted. This is understood to be the meta-arguments that claim information about the object-level.
15In both cases, Re j(drugh) is justiﬁed. Recall that Re j(drugh) = [[drugh : arg]⇒ re j(drugh)]. This means
that [drugh : arg] is a justiﬁed argument (omitted from Figure 3.1). This is not a problem as [drugh : arg] is the
meta-argument claiming the existence of an argument for taking medication in the object level, and is not itself
the argument for taking medication.
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3.2. Representing the Effects of Critical Questions
Now recall from Section 2.3 that CQs can serve as either pointers to counterarguments
against a given AS, or shift the burden of proof such that the proposer of the argument
instantiating the AS, would need to satisfactorily answer the CQ else the argument is
defeated. By adding an extra “question” type qu and “questioning” function symbol of
signature qu→ wff to Lm, we can represent the effects of CQs as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.10. We add a further ground type called question, denoted qu, to Lm. We
add a further function symbol called questioning the premise, denoted qp : qu → w f f ,
to Lm. We add two meta-argumentation defeasible rules to Rd,m:
(A : arg,Q : qu,qp(Q) ε Prem(A) :Ω⇒ attk(Q,A)) and
(R : arg,Q : qu,qp(Q)Conc(R) :Ω⇒ attk(R,Q)),
where the ﬁrst rule denotes how CQs can question an argument’s premise for further
reasons, and the second rule captures the effect of replying to a CQ.
Example 3.11. (Example 2.4 continued) Suppose that Eric wants to seek clariﬁcation
and asks whether his medication is needed, as it was only required because he has had
a TIA, and it seems his GP wrote “TIN”. We have a question by Eric Q : qu which ques-
tions a premise of drug : arg, i.e. qp(Q) ε Prem(drug). Therefore, we have an argument
[[drug : arg], [Q : qu], [qp(Q) ε Prem(drug) : Ω⇒ attk(Q,drug)]]. This question is thus
represented as a meta-argument concluding a meta-attack. However, the GP responds
with the argument R : arg which provides reasons, such as that she wrote too fast and
“TIA” looks like “TIN”, so qp(Q)  Conc(R) : Ω, i.e. the premise that is being ques-
tioned by Q is addressed by the claim of the replying argument R, which provides further
reasons. Therefore, we have a rebutting argument [[R : arg], [Q : qu], [qp(Q)Conc(R) :
Ω]⇒ attk(R,Q)]. This reply thus reinstates drug : arg.16
In other words, the nature of the conﬂict here is not a conﬂict between contradictory
pieces of information, but rather an argument should not be justiﬁed if it has not yet
satisfactorily answered all questions against it. Example 3.11 is one way of showing
how instantiated metalevel frameworks can provide a uniform representation of both
interrogative assertions (questions) and declarative assertions (formulae and arguments).
4. Conclusions, Related Work, Future Work
We have investigated how instantiating metalevel argumentation with ASPIC+D and a
higher-order typed language can be a model for argumentation-based decision support.
By working directly with MAFs, we go beyond its role as a theoretical construct that
allows for a uniform representation of abstract argumentation and its important variants.
The beneﬁts of this include the ability to reason about information that is not normally
expressed in the object-level, such as the rationale for attacks, while retaining the simple
and intuitive method of AFs to determine which arguments are justiﬁed.
16This manner of reinstating an argument by answering a question against it follows [16].
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The framework articulated in this paper makes use of the theory of EAFs, MAFs, and
ASPIC+D . Our approach differs from EAFs [15,19] because MAFs retain Dung-style rea-
soning rather than having to deal with reinstatement sets and collective attacks. Further,
working in the metalevel can also account for attacks and questions in addition to rep-
resenting preferences. This work differs from previous studies involving ASPIC+D [5,14]
because we are using it to represent metalevel arguments and information through the
use of local languages rather than representing arguments expressed in formulae of some
appropriate propositional or ﬁrst-order language. Some may be concerned that ASPIC+D
may not be as expressive as ASPIC+, but as [14] has argued, the defeasible fragment
of ASPIC+ has sufﬁcient expressivity for many domains of application, is most likely
easier to implement, and is not complicated by subtleties involving normative rationality
and restricted rebuts.
To the best of our knowledge, this application of the ideas of local languages from
topos theory to knowledge representation in argumentation is new. The only other work
we are aware of in our ﬁeld that uses ideas from topos theory is that of Atkinson et al. [6],
where topos theory provides a denotational semantics for the PARMA dialogue protocol
for multi-agent systems. This paper has only articulated a representational framework,
and future work will aim to establish some results, by addressing, for example: (1) how
can one deﬁne the distinguished predicates of Deﬁnition 3.2 in terms of more primitive
predicates or are they just given for knowledge representation purposes; (2) clarifying
the underlying set theory which will allow us to deﬁne Kp,m as a subclass of Lm in
Deﬁnition 3.3; (3) whether the omitted features ofLm (Footnote 7), such as its soundness
and completeness over all possible elementary topoi that interpret the language, have
relevance to argumentation.
The idea of endowing metalevel argumentation with structure using ASPIC+ and ar-
gumentation schemes has been considered by Mu¨ller et al. [22]. While they also consider
instantiating MAFs, they retain an ASPIC+ object-level framework and lift object-level
information to the metalevel via support relations of bimodal graphs. However, we rea-
son directly in the metalevel using a higher-order typed language. As stated in Section 3,
the object-level frameworks in [22] are based on ASPIC+ and cannot accommodate the
representation of additional reasons for attacks and the effects of questions. Note that it
could be argued that CQs are more naturally represented as being posed over the course
of a dialogue (e.g. [16]). Instead, we have represented CQs in a “static” situation where
the argument graph is given rather than incrementally constructed over rounds. This is
not a problem because the use of CQs dynamically over the course of a dialogue would
yield an AF that is evaluated statically in each round.
Future work will include a more rigorous formulation of this framework and a more
thorough study of its properties, especially regarding the subtleties of Lm and its topos-
theoretic semantics. We will also consider how domain-speciﬁc argumentation schemes,
such as the schemes elicited from experts in [26], can be incorporated into our medical-
style running example. More practically, we hope to investigate how such a decision
support system can be implemented with a suitable argumentation engine that can reason
with an appropriate representation of the input data, and relate the static evaluation of
the generated frameworks with dialogical aspects of argumentation [16].
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